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Abstract 
This paper presents empirical results of research on the influence of social aspects on the 
organization of transactions in the domain of chains and networks. The research method used 
was a gaming simulation called the Trust and Tracing game in which participants trade 
commodity goods with a hidden quality attribute. Previous sessions of this gaming simulation 
identified a list of variables for further investigation (Meijer et al, 2006). The use of gaming 
simulation as data gathering tool for quantitative research in supply chains and networks is a 
proof-of-principle. This paper shows results from 27 newly conducted sessions and previously 
unused data from 3 older sessions. Tests confirmed the use of network and market modes of 
organization. Pre-existing social relations influenced the course of the action in the sessions. 
Being socially embedded was not beneficial for the score on the performance indicators 
money and points. The hypothesized reduction in measurable transaction costs when there 
was high trust between the participants could not be found. Further analysis revealed that 
participants are able to suspect cheats in a session based on other factors than tracing. Testing 
hypotheses with data gathered in a gaming simulation proved feasible. Experiences with the 
methodology used are discussed. 
 
Keywords: gaming simulation, social relations, trust, transactions, supply networks 
 
1. Introduction 
Chain and network sciences is a stream of research that focuses on an application domain 
rather than on an aspect domain. Aspects to be investigated range from pure technology to 
social relationships. A typical consumer good has been traded in a series of transactions 
before it reaches the consumer. The sequential businesses involved in the supply of the good 
can be viewed as one supply network. Focusing on the actual route of a particular product 
through the network identifies the supply chain of this good. Typically, the aspects are not 
investigated independently but in an interdisciplinary approach. Interdisciplinary research 
requires research methods suited for studying multiple aspects simultaneously. Meijer et al 
(2006) presented a gaming simulation that made participants learn about transactions and 
embeddedness in a trade network. In the discussion the authors identified a need to collect 
more data to answer specific questions about what drives the course of the game sessions. 
They listed a series of variables that could be of value for research in the simulated supply 
network. The current paper is the result of continued research into the variables identified 
using the Trust and Tracing game (T&T game) by playing 27 additional sessions and using 
quantitative data analysis.  
 
The next section describes the methodological contribution. The current paper is showing a 
proof-of-principle of using a gaming simulation for quantitative research in the chain and 
network domain.  Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework and hypotheses, based on 
New Institutional Economics. Materials and methods are in Section 4. Section 5 analyses the 
data gathered and Section 6 provides a discussion of the results and methodology used. 
Finally, Section 7 draws conclusions. 
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2. Methodological contribution 
In the present study, gaming simulation is used as a quantitative research method. Although 
gaming simulation is widely used as a training instrument, its application as a data-gathering 
tool is relatively new. The incorporation of social variables and the application in the domain 
of chains and networks are contributions of this paper. The objective is to test if the method 
works for quantitative testing of hypotheses in this domain. 
 
Duke and Geurts (2004) emphasize that the gaming simulation approach is relevant for 
strategic problem solving. It enables decision makers to analyse a multi-agent, multi-faceted 
real-world problem. In the approach of Duke and Geurts the decision makers are most often 
participants in the gaming simulation themselves. The effectiveness of gaming simulation for 
learning has been demonstrated in different settings, though it lacks a shared evaluation 
structure amongst them (Gosen and Washbush, 2004). The most prominent application has 
been for learning insights in complex problems (Druckmann, 1994). Authors that document 
cases of using the method, e.g. Duke and Geurts (2004), and Wenzler (2003), received good 
results for the problems at hand. 
Gaming simulation as a data gathering tool for research is a logical extension, since it does 
not require any adaptations to the practices of Duke and Geurts (2004). In their 27-step guide 
to a successful gaming simulation they emphasize the importance of operationalizing the key 
concepts used in a gaming simulation. Operational (and measurable) concepts are therefore 
required. Few authors recognized this opportunity to analyse behavioural change with a 
gaming simulation. Roelofs (2000) tested a mapping technique for structuring policy issues 
using a gaming simulation as a test bed.  The approach is similar to the one used in the present 
paper as she explains behaviour within a session with data  gathered in a gaming simulation, 
but she differs in the nature of the data (qualitative), the study domain (policy research) and 
the absence of explanatory models about why something happened. The methodology of 
Roelofs (2000) can be seen as the qualitative predecessor of the one used in the present paper. 
Kuit et al (2005) used a computer supported gaming simulation to investigate strategic 
behaviour in a deregulating energy market. Their model is numeric but their data collection, 
results and conclusions are based on qualitative observations of participants' behaviour. De 
Caluwe (1997) researched an organizational culture intervention using a gaming simulation as 
an intervention tool. The data used were not collected from within the sessions but from 
interviews and questionnaires ex ante and ex post the intervention. The CIRAD institute uses 
combinations of participative development of multi-agent (computer) models and role-playing 
games (Barreteau, 2003). They do not use raw data from the role-playing games directly, but 
only the (qualitative) reactions of participants to help modelling the computer models. 
Within the domain of chains and networks a few gaming simulation approaches come close to 
the method used in the current paper as there is a growing amount of computer based chain 
simulations used for training (Meijer and Hofstede (2003a, Van Liere, 2006). The computer 
based gaming environment facilitates quantitative data collection about behaviour in a gaming 
simulation. The authors do not know about any gaming simulation that tries to explain why 
participants act like they do in a session with quantitative data collected in the same session. 
Hofstede et al (2003) developed a computer-based chain game for distributed trading and 
negotiation. This tool promised to facilitate data-gathering from actual sessions but has not 
been applied in actual research projects. A second difference is the absence of face-to-face 
negotiation in a computer environment inhibiting the emergence of real-world social relations 
in a session. 
 
3. Theory 
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The variables mentioned in Meijer et al (2006) have different meanings depending on the 
theory used, as they stem from different bodies of knowledge, like economics, sociology and 
psychology. Section 4.4 lists the variables in detail and the way they are measured in this 
paper. There is no single theory that explains the relation between these variables. Focussing 
on one or two variables opens disciplinary discussions that are valuable, but prohibits an 
integrative approach explaining the behaviour in the (simulated) supply chain. Therefore a 
framework is needed to link theories. 
 
Williamson (2000) introduced a four-level framework linking theories with a very different 
scope as the framework for analysis of New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Figure 1). Each of 
the levels changes about ten times as fast as the level above. Williamson calls the top level 
“social embeddedness”, though this term is used differently from its use in other theory. As he 
lists customs, traditions, norms and informal institutions this level can be called 'culture'. 
Culture can be defined as “the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the 
members of one group or category of people from others” (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005, pp 
4). Culture in this sense is acquired in the early years of a person’s life. Culture changes in 
centuries or even longer. Williamson (2000) calls the theory used on this level 'social theory'. 
Culture influences the second level, the institutional environment. At this level the formal 
rules of a trade community appear, often as the legislative environment of a country. Hence 
the theories used on this level are economics of property right and positive political theory. 
Changes occur in times of tens to one hundred years. 
 
Figure 1: Four-level model of Williamson (2000) 
 
Level 3 consists of the governance structure. Williamson (1996, p. 12) defines governance 
structures as ways to implement order for facing potential conflicts that could threaten 
opportunities to realize mutual gains. Hendrikse (2003) is more concrete in his definition as a 
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collection of rules, institutions and constraints structuring the transactions between the various 
stakeholders. Coase (1937) grouped arrangements of a structure under the expression 
“institutional structure of production”, while Williamson speaks of “mechanisms of 
governance”. Menard captures the same ideas under the generic expression “modes of 
organization”. Menards term will be used here, as it makes clear the focus on the organization 
of transactions researched using the T&T game. 
There are three archetypical modes of organization: market, hierarchy and network (Powell, 
1990, Figure 2). The market mechanism is characterized by single-term transactions. Buyers 
and sellers constantly seek for the best product for the best price and move to another trade 
partner if that is financially attractive. Costs and benefits are determined by the supply and 
demand curve and result in an optimal equilibrium price in case of a perfect market. The 
hierarchy mechanism uses contracts of some duration in which one party purchases 
production capacity from the other. Ultimately this means that the seller becomes an 
employee of the buyer. The network mechanism uses repeated transactions between 
independent companies or, more likely, between people in those companies. These business 
relations transcend the immediate business context, and shape mutual expectations on 
behaviour that will not harm the trade partner. The triangle shape of figure 2 indicates that a 
real-world mode of organization will be a mixture of the three archetypical modes, 
represented as a dot somewhere in the triangle. 
 
 
Figure 2: Modes of organization (Diederen and Jonkers, 2001, after Powell, 1990). The 
corners are pure forms. The triangle spans a space of possible mixed forms. 
 
Menard (2005) uses the name 'hybrid arrangements' as the third term instead of network, but 
mentions this term is not fully satisfying. He sees hybrids as a range where “at one end of the 
spectrum, close to market arrangements, hybrids rely primarily on trust: decisions are 
decentralized and coordination relies on mutual 'influence' and reciprocity. At the other end, 
hybrids come close to integration, with tight coordination through quasi-autonomous 
governing bodies or 'bureaus' sharing some attributes of a hierarchy.(...) Between these polar 
cases, mild forms of 'authority' develop, based on relational networks or on leadership. 
Relational networks (...) rely on tighter coordination than trust, with formal rules and 
conventions based on long-term relationships, on complementary competences, and/or on 
social 'connivance' (Powell et al., 1996).” This paper uses the term 'network' as the T&T 
game allows for appearance of trust-based and relational network-based hybrid arrangements 
only, staying away from added complexity of trader-external institutions. 
 
On this level 3 the embeddedness takes place that is discussed by Granovetter (1985). 
Granovetter distinguishes between theories that use under-socialized and over-socialized 
explanations of economic action within social theory. Embeddedness theory, instead, 
acknowledges that ongoing networks of social relations between people discourage 
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malfeasance. People guide their choices based on past interactions with people and continue 
to deal with those they trust. 
 
At level 4 the actual business happens. Here is a constant flow of contracts and transactions 
going on. On this level the actual transaction costs are made, as (medium to short-term) 
contract negotiations and transactions cause the spending of time and money. The mode of 
organization determines the structure of the transaction costs. For each contract between 
traders in a supply chain involving one or many transactions there are costs of searching, 
bargaining, monitoring and enforcing (Williamson, 1985; Coase, 1937). These transaction 
costs do not add value to a product and should be minimized through an appropriate mode of 
organization. Williamson (1985) linked transaction costs and the mode of organization 
through what he called the “discrete alignment principle”: traders will adopt the mode of 
organization that fits better with the attributes of the transaction at stake. In doing so, 
Williamson provided a way for empirical studies to go around the difficulty of measuring 
transaction costs directly, making organizational form the dependent variable (Menard, 2005). 
 
New Institutional Economics is principally concerned with levels 2 and 3 of figure 1. But 
Williamson recognizes that NIE cannot ignore level 1, although 'level 1 is taken as given by 
most institutional economists'. 
 
From observations of sample 1, Meijer et al (2006) concluded that in T&T sessions the 
dominant mode of organization is Network. Transactions were organized through repeated 
transactions with the same business partners, and sessions had been observed where trade was 
divided in language groups. To check this quantitatively in the new session, hypothesis 1 is 
formulated: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The dominant mode of organization in the T&T game is network, not 
market. 
 
The design of the T&T game makes that every session by default starts with the market mode. 
Actual trade between people with possibly pre-existing relationships makes that the network 
mode can emerge from subsequent transactions. The hierarchy mode is not accounted for in 
the design of the T&T game, and can only manifest itself via pre-existing dominance 
relationships. The experimental session set-up (Section 4.2) avoided hierarchy through 
selection of the participants.  
 
What indicators can be used to indicate whether the mode of organization is network or 
market? Menard (2005) mentions trust and relational contracting as two drivers for the 
network mode. 
Assumptions of a (perfect) market mode are: 
− perfect information about supply and demand at no cost; 
− a product that can be compared to any other item in the same market, i.e. a commodity; 
− buyers will prefer the lowest priced item of two comparable products; 
− no preference for a trade partner. 
 
Contrasting these assumptions are the following assumptions of a trust and/or relational 
contracting-based mode: 
− there are preferred trade partners for other reasons than price; 
− trade depends on economic AND relational factors. 
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The assumptions lead to two tests that can confirm or reject hypothesis 1: 
a. there will be no preference for a trade partner; 
b. the results at the end of a session depend on economic and relational factors. 
Section 5 describes the tests and the outcomes. 
 
Lazzarini et al (2001) introduced six sources of value improvement for supply chains and 
networks. Meijer et al (2006) state that the 'social structure' category was most manifest in the 
T&T game in six variables: number of participants, language, group identity, culture, 
professional relationships and personal relationships. The social structure in a chain consists 
of many relations between agents. There is a multitude of aspects involved in judging the 
quality of the relations. As said before, the professional and personal relationships are two 
viewpoints, but also language and group identity, e.g. different studies, can divide people into 
groups. Culture (Hofstede and Hofstede, 2005), and more specifically the uncertainty 
avoidance factor, moderates the attitude of groups towards people from a different group. Do 
you trust people you don't know? And does it matter if somebody is from a different group? 
Rousseau et al (1998) show that economists, psychologists and sociologists tend to work with 
different conceptions of trust. This paper adopts the compromise definition presented by 
Rousseau et al. (1998, p.395): Trust is a psychological state comprising the intention to 
accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the intentions or behaviour of 
another. 
The keyword in this definition is vulnerability. Trusting people means that you do not need to 
take the trouble of checking on them, accepting the chance that they might cheat on you. Trust 
without vulnerability is gratuitous. This implies trust can only increase gradually through 
being tested in situations of reciprocal interdependency (Hofstede, 2003). 
The importance of trust for supply chains and networks is widely accepted (Harland, 1999). 
Camps et al (2004) show that absence of trust is a reason for failure for supply chain projects. 
Trust is a key concept to be able to have a relationship (Pimentel Claro et al, 2004). 
Nooteboom et al (1997) stress that trust enables partners to manage risk and opportunism in 
transactions. Powell (1990) says that trust helps to reduce complexity in transaction making. 
Anderson and Narus (1990) explain that trust reflects the extent to which negotiations are fair 
and commitments are sustained. Uzzi (1997) shows that close relations (embedded relations 
as he calls it after Granovetter, 1985) with high trust are of key importance in the New York 
fashion industry. In New Institutional Economics trust becomes operational via the 
transaction costs. Uzzi (1997) showed that searching and monitoring of complex transactions 
was less needed with trusted partners. Being over-embedded however caused lock-in 
situations where it was impossible to do business or exchange information with new business 
partners. This leads to the formulation of hypothesis 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2: High trust between traders in a network reduces transaction costs. 
 
Both Menard (2005) and Williamson (2000) believe that transaction costs are notoriously 
hard to measure. In the T&T game one form of transaction costs (the checking costs) are 
modelled in a measurable way. The other forms of transaction costs are emergent and express 
themselves in the mode of organization. To confirm the hypothesis while overcoming the 
measurement obstacle, three tests will be done. 
 
a. Test for correlation between (stated) trust and measurable transaction costs (Checking 
 costs in the T&T game) 
b. Test for correlation between (stated) trust and stated preferences for business partners. 
c. Test whether tracing was the only way to reveal cheats. 
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4. Materials and methods 
4.1  The Trust and Tracing game 
Meijer et al (2006) describe the T&T game in detail. For sake of readability this paper 
summarizes the design and highlights aspects important for the analysis. 
The T&T game is a role-playing gaming simulation modelling a supply network of a good 
with a hidden quality attribute. There are four roles for participants: producer, middlemen, 
retailer and consumer. Producers get their produce for free and know exactly what they have 
in stock at the start of a session. Middlemen and retailers should buy and sell products to 
make profit. Producers, middlemen and retailers (traders) compete for a price per role where 
the person who earned the most money takes it all. Consumers have a large amount of money 
and should acquire as many points as possible with this money. There is a price for the 
consumer with the most points too. 
There is one role for the game leader: the tracing agency. Middlemen, retailers and consumers 
can come to the tracing agency to ask for a trace, revealing the hidden attribute of the product 
and if anybody upstream lied about it. Tracing costs money if no cheat is found. If a cheat is 
found, the cheater will be punished financially. Table 2A lists the punishments among other 
variables. The tracing agency keeps the money collected. 
The product used is a sealed envelope that contains a high or low quality mark. The product 
comes in three different types, each with two qualities worth different amounts of points 
(Table 1). Traders are never allowed to open the envelopes. If they want to know the real 
quality they must ask the tracing agency for a trace.  
 
Table 1: Points per envelope for consumers. 
Quality\ Type Red Yellow Blue 
Low 1 2 3 
High 2 6 12 
High : Low ratio 2:1 3:1 4:1 
 
A transaction in the Trust and Tracing game is an oral agreement between two participants 
about the trade of one or more products. Negotiated properties of a transaction are: the total 
price paid by the buyer and the amount, type and quality of the products delivered by the 
seller. The price is the result of open negotiation. To help the start-up every trader receives 
suggested start prices. Table 2A lists the prices among other variables. The giant differences 
helped to open negotiations at the beginning of a session, though are neglected as soon as the 
real negotiations start. 
Every trader must stick a label onto every envelope sold either from the high or low quality 
set of labels he has. It needs to be the label for stated quality, i.e. the quality that he tells his 
customer. There are no other rules in the gaming simulation. Anybody is allowed to do 
business with anybody, although the physical setting (similar to the trade structure in Figure 3 
suggests doing business with the adjacent traders in the chain. 
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Figure 3: Possible flows of goods in the Trust and Tracing Game (Meijer and Hofstede, 
2003b) 
 
4.2 Experimental Session Setup 
The load of a gaming simulation is the value of the initial configuration parameters a gaming 
simulation has. The situation of sessions are the characterizing variables that are not part of 
the gaming simulation but can help interpret why sessions with similar people and a similar 
load may go differently. The load and situation of the sessions presented in this paper can be 
found in tables 2A and 2B. 
 
Table 2A: Load of experimental sessions (P=producer, M=middleman, R=retailer, 
C=consumer) 
Variable Load A (sample 2 and 3) Load B (sample 4) 
Participants 8 - 24 
Division of roles 1P:1M:1R:2C. When perfect ratio is not possible: first add a consumer, than a producer, 
than a middleman. 
Rounds 3 1 
Product Sealed envelopes with different colour codings for type 
Start quantities of 
money 
P: 5 / M: 10 / R: 15 / C: 200 
Start quantities of 
products 
P: 6 for every type and every quality (36 
total) 
M: 2 low quality Yellow 
R: 2 high quality Blue 
P: same 
M: none 
R: none 
Tracing costs M: 2 / R: 5 / C: 10, to be paid only when no cheat was found 
Cheat punishments P: 2 / M: 5 / R: 10 plus public announcement 
Suggested prices P: equal to the amount of points worth for consumers 
M: 2.5 * prices for P 
R:  6 * prices for P 
 
Table 2B: Situation of experimental sessions.  
Variable  
Selection of participants Students in higher education, except for session 20, which still was in a 
classroom setting. Participation was part of a course. 
Real-world implications of 
participation 
None. It was ensured by the game leaders that course teachers would not use 
results from a session in a grade. 
Game leader 1, Sebastiaan Meijer for all session except 29 (sample 1) 
Duration of session 30 to 45 minutes of playing time. 2 hours max. including debriefing 
Location Classrooms of participating education institute or similar venues in a 
conference centre 
 
The data collection methods used consisted of a pre- and a post-questionnaire with questions 
using 5-point Likert scales. The questions are listed in Appendix B. Furthermore, the 
participants themselves counted game money and points at the end of a session and put their 
products (envelopes with labels marking transactions) and money in a participant-specific 
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large envelope.  The game leader made structured session transcripts during the sessions as a 
third source of data. His data is from a qualitative character and is used here in the discussion. 
 
As the empirical cycle is of an iterative nature, better insights can lead to new ways of data 
collection or different loads or situations of sessions. In the case of the T&T game the data 
collection of money and products hasn't changed. After a first iteration some questions were 
added to the pre- and post-questionnaire. The last series of sessions had a different load as a 
session consisted of only 1 round instead of 3. Appendix A lists the sessions conducted with 
the T&T game. The sample column gives insight in changes between sessions. Sample 1 
consists of all sessions used in Meijer et al (2006). Three of them could be used in other 
samples too as the experimental session setup coincidentally appeared to be the same. Sample 
2 consists of all sessions with load A and a complete data collection. Sample 4 consists of all 
sessions with load B and a full data collection. Sample 3 consists of sessions that had load A 
but failed in data collection on one or more points due to external influences like no time for 
questionnaires, overly chaotic groups or inappropriateness of asking certain questions in a 
situation. The addition of extra questions in the questionnaires cannot be seen from the 
samples but expresses itself in item non-response when analysing sample 2. As this appears to 
play a very small role in the analyses in this paper sample 2 has been treated as one group. 
 
4.3 Operationalization of variables 
Meijer et al (2006) list variables to be taken into account when conducting research into 
factors that drive the course of action in sessions of the T&T game. The results of their 
learning sessions (Sample 1 in Appendix A) gave some pointers about which elements of 
social structure to take into account in order to answer these questions. “Possibly relevant 
variables to measure a priori are: number of participants per session; number of participants 
per role, and for each participant: gender; nationality; age; profession; and for each dyad: 
degree of mutual acquaintance. During the session, (the following) behavioural variables per 
participant X are relevant: with how many other has X traded; how trustworthy was X; if X 
requested a trace, why was that; what happened after a trace. After a session, output 
variables can be collected. Per session: what was the price level? What was the speed? What 
was the quality level (as % false High-quality products)? Per participant: what financial 
result did X achieve, and what is X’s reputation with trade partners?” 
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Figure 4: Analytical model for T&T game, modelled after Figure 1. 
 
To be able to couple concepts of the theory and hypotheses to actual measurements this paper 
uses the analytical model in figure 4 following the 4-level model of Williamson (2000) in 
figure 1. Table 2 lists for each of the items in the analytical model how they are measured and 
using what tool.  
 
Table 2: Operationalization of variables for the Trust and Tracing Game.( P=producer, 
M=middleman, R=retailer, C=consumer) 
Variable Measurement  Tool 
Culture Nationality as a proxy Pre Questionnaire 
Relation History Likert scale: average knowledge, difference in 
knowledge, and trust of other participants. 
Pre Questionnaire 
Institutional 
Environment 
Rules and Roles enforced via game design. Incentives 
via orally announced award for best P, M, R and C. 
Game design 
Load Structure: predetermined ratio between roles. 
Resources: amount of money given in advance, amount 
of envelopes given in advance. 
Prices: via instructions 
Game load: office preparation 
Transaction costs 
(social) 
Emergent, not measured. Expresses itself in mode of 
organization.  
Post Questionnaire 
Transaction costs 
(checking) 
Price per check Instructions 
Mode of organization Share of buying and selling with each possible trade 
partner summed over all participants 
Constructed from transactions 
Transactions For each product a list of sell-actions with the quality it 
has been sold for plus a mark for who ended up with the 
product. 
Envelopes with labels. 
Traces For each envelope: has it been traced? If so: who traced? Envelopes with manual trace 
marks 
Costs made by 
checking 
The number of traces multiplied by the trace fee per role 
of the tracer. 
In the session: paid by tracer. 
Afterwards: calculated from 
traces. 
Agent Performance For P / M / R: money left at the end. 
For C: number of points and amount of money left at the 
end. 
Counted by participants and 
counted by game leaders 
afterwards. Game leader 
count was more accurate. 
Chain Performance Money per point, Percentage of cheated envelopes. Constructed from transactions 
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Percentage of product that reached the consumers. 
Distribution of profits over the chain. 
and performance agents. 
 
5. Tests of hypotheses 
From 27 newly conducted sessions and previously unused data from 3 older sessions a data 
set has been derived with 430 unique participants trading over 2500 product items in more 
than 5000 transactions. Appendix A lists the sessions. Sample 1-sessions are the older 
sessions used as empirical material for Meijer et al (2006). Samples 2, 3 and 4 are new. 
Sample 2 and 3 share load A, while sample 4 used load B (Table 2A). 
 
5.1  The dominant mode of organization used in the T&T game is Network, not Market. 
Test 1A: There will be no preference for a trade partner 
In the Trust and Tracing game every product can be expressed as an amount of points worth 
for the consumers, and thus is a commodity. It is rational to assume that in the session where 
practical barriers between traders are absent commodities will be bought from all available 
suppliers equally. For every actor in a session the ‘selectiveness’-score has been calculated. 
The ‘selectiveness’-score (SS) is defined as: 
 
SS(Ym) = for i=1 to N Σ (% of all sales with possible buyer Xn)2 
 
Where: % of all sales with possible buyer = [ 0 .. 1] 
  Xn  = each agent that possible could buy from Ym 
  Ym = selling agent 
 
Similarly the SS can be calculated for a buyer. 
The theoretical SS for every actor can be calculated assuming equal trade with every trade 
partner possible. Assumptions have to be made who can be regarded as a possible trade 
partner. In the case of a producer there have been sessions in which the middlemen were the 
only trade partners, thus sticking to a strict chain sequence, and there have been (many) 
sessions in which the consumers bought from producers directly. If the participants do not 
consider bypassing a node in the chain is appropriate behaviour, the number of possible trade 
partners reduces. The rules of the T&T game do not suggest nor prohibit any bypassing.  
 
In this analysis only the selectiveness scores for producers and consumers are calculated for 
two reasons. First the amount of consumers in the sessions was largest and from all traders the 
producers were the first role to get one person extra in case of asymmetric chain 
configurations, therefore N is highest for these two roles. Second, being the start and the end 
of the chain respectively, the SS is only one-sided. The structure of the data did not allow 
two-sided SS to be disentangled for supply and demand. 
 
The theoretical minimum SS for producers assuming middlemen as possible trade partners is: 
 
 SS (P) = #M * (for i=1 to #M Σ (1/#M)2) 
 
The theoretical minimum SS for consumers assuming retailers as possible trade partners is: 
 
 SS (C) = #R * (for i=1 to #R Σ (1/#R)2) 
 
In figure 5 the outcome can be found for the non-parametric test for differences between the 
theoretical minimum score and the actual SS. The ranks table shows a majority of positive 
ranks for MiminumSelectiveness(M) – ActualSelectiveness, which means that the majority of 
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the producers had an SS lower than the theoretical minimum. This indicates that not only the 
middlemen were a possible trade partner, but all downstream agents can be regarded. The 
MinimumSelectiveness(MRC) is the theoretical minimum SS for middlemen, retailers and 
consumers available in the session of the particular producer. The ranks table shows only 4 
positive ranks for MinimumSelectiveness(MRC) - ActualSelectiveness, and they stem from 
producers who did not trade at all. (ActualSelectiveness = 0). The test statistics show a .000 
significance for ActualSelectiveness being smaller than the theoretical minimum. This rejects 
the proposition that there will be no preference for trade partners. 
 
Figure 5: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for Selectiveness Score (Producers) 
    N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 80 43.86 3509.00 
Positive Ranks 4 15.25 61.00 
Ties 0     
MinimumSelectiveness (MRC) - 
ActualSelectiveness 
Total 84     
Negative Ranks 24 30.96 743.00 
Positive Ranks 57 45.23 2578.00 
Ties 3     
MinimumSelectiveness (M) - 
ActualSelectiveness 
Total 84     
 
 Test Statistics(c) 
  MinimumSelectiveness (MRC) - 
ActualSelectiveness 
MinimumSelectiveness (M) - 
ActualSelectiveness 
Z -7.689(a) -4.320(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
a  Based on positive ranks. 
b  Based on negative ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
In figure 6 the outcome can be found for the non-parametric test for differences between the 
theoretical score (MinimumSelectiveness(R) and MinimumSelectiveness(PMR), respectively) 
and the ActualSelectiveness. The ranks table shows about 1/3 of positive ranks for 
MinimumSelectiveness(R) – ActualSelectiveness, revealing consumers who had a SS lower 
than the theoretical minimum. This, and the finding from the producers, indicates that 
consumers could buy from all upstream agents. The MinimumSelectiveness(PMR) is the 
theoretical minimum SS for producers, middlemen and retailers available in the session of the 
particular consumer. The ranks table shows 16 positive ranks that stem from consumers who 
did not buy at all. (ActualSelectiveness = 0) The test statistics show a .000 significance for 
ActualSelectiveness being smaller than the theoretical minimum. This rejects the proposition 
that there will be no preference for trade partners. 
 
Figure 6: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test for SS(Consumers) 
    N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Negative Ranks 127 98.53 12513.00 
Positive Ranks 62 87.77 5442.00 
Ties 5     
MinimumSelectiveness (R) - 
ActualSelectiveness  
  
  
Total 194     
Negative Ranks 178 104.60 18619.00 
Positive Ranks 16 18.50 296.00 
Ties 0     
MinimumSelectiveness (PMR) - 
ActualSelectiveness  
  
  
Total 194     
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 Test Statistics(c) 
  MinimumSelectiveness (R) - 
ActualSelectiveness  
MinimumSelectiveness 
(PMR) - ActualSelectiveness  
Z -4.696(b) -11.701(b) 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
b  Based on positive ranks. 
c  Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
 
Test 1B1: The amount of points earned by consumers depends on economic and 
relational variables (assuming network mechanism). 
A regression of the number of points earned by consumers with economic and relational 
variables yields the model in figure 7. (R-square = .486)  
 
 Coefficients(a,b) 
  
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error 
(Constant) 45,074 35,802   1,259 ,212 
Money spent ,111 ,087 ,116 1,280 ,204 
# Participants in session 3,515 1,432 ,216 2,455 ,016 
Average knowledge of others 
-16,586 5,604 -,259 -2,960 ,004 
Difference in knowledge of others 
-,239 5,126 -,004 -,047 ,963 
Trust in others 
-12,156 6,159 -,171 -1,974 ,052 
Did you cooperate 
-3,458 3,422 -,084 -1,011 ,315 
How many envelopes did you buy 4,831 ,710 ,786 6,808 ,000 
How often have you been cheated upon 
-2,034 1,672 -,117 -1,217 ,227 
How many suppliers 
-7,238 3,812 -,196 -1,899 ,061 
a  Dependent Variable: Points 
b  IsConsumer = 1,00 
Figure 7: Coefficients of the number of points earned by consumers, sample 2, 3 and 4 
 
The relation between ‘how many envelopes did you buy’ and the number of points earned 
seems obvious at first, but considering the differences in points that each envelope is worth, it 
could have been the case that people buying only the 12-point-type had more points than 
people buying many of the less-worth envelopes. The amount of points earned can further be 
explained from relational variables ‘average knowledge of others’ and ‘trust in others’, though 
negatively. The number of participants in a session is significant too. The number of suppliers 
was negatively influencing the amount of points earned. It appears from this analysis than the 
less you know the others and the more anonymous one is in a larger group, the more points 
you earn. Forming a good trade relationship with only a few suppliers indicates the use of the 
network mechanism. The amount of money spent is insignificant. This is in line with 
observations that prices differed enormous between transactions.  
 
Test 1B2: The amount of money earned by traders depends on economic and relational 
variables (assuming network mechanism). 
A regression of the amount of money earned by traders (Money) with economic and relational 
variables yields the model in figure 8. (R-square = .244)  
 
For traders the number of envelopes sold is not significant for the amount of money earned. 
The number of buyers, the number of participants in a session and if they cooperated with 
somebody else were determining the success of a trader. The insignificance of average 
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knowledge and trust of other participants seems to contradict the model in figure 8, the 
differences of knowledge of others is significant. The cooperate-factor upon closer inspection 
is influenced by producers cooperating and forming a kongsi. These kongsies were very 
successful in asking high prices. The significance of the number of people in a session 
suggests that the same more anonymous situation in which consumers earn more points works 
for traders too.  
 
 Coefficients(a,b) 
   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta B Std. Error 
(Constant) 
-165,401 55,263   -2,993 ,003 
 # Participants in session 6,005 2,431 ,201 2,470 ,015 
 Average knowledge of others 1,892 11,099 ,013 ,170 ,865 
 Difference in knowledge of others 13,507 7,835 ,130 1,724 ,087 
 Trust in others 11,212 11,203 ,079 1,001 ,319 
 Did you cooperate 12,818 7,242 ,138 1,770 ,079 
 How many envelopes did you sell ,892 ,834 ,118 1,069 ,287 
 How many buyers 18,676 6,140 ,329 3,042 ,003 
 How often did you cheat 
-3,750 2,409 -,139 -1,557 ,122 
a  Dependent Variable: Money 
 
Figure 8: Coefficients of the amount of money earned by traders, sample 2, 3 and 4 
 
Test 1C: Various correlations 
Figure 9 shows four correlations found in a correlation matrix of social variables ‘Trust in 
others’, ‘Average knowledge of others’ and ‘Did you cooperate’ with variables that described 
cheating, buying and selling behaviour. The matrix used data from sample 2, 3 and 4, 
separated in subgroup ‘traders’ and ‘consumers’. 
 
Variable  % Cheated Of Sell 
Corr .170 
Sign. .029 
Trust in 
others 
N 165 
 
Variable  How Often Did You Cheat How Many Envelopes Did You Sell 
Corr -.200 -.221 
Sign. .009 .004 
Did you cooperate 
N 169 169 
Figure 9: Various correlations for traders, sample 2, 3 and 4. 
 
5.2:  High trust between traders in a network reduces transaction costs. 
Test 2A: Test for correlation between trust and measurable transaction costs (Checking 
costs in the T&T game) 
Outcome of this test is calculated using sample 2, 3 and 4. No correlation could be found 
between the stated trust level and the number of traces, as is shown in table 3. When tested for 
each of the roles that were able to trace, there still is no correlation found.  
 
Table 3: Correlation between stated trust and number of traces for different roles 
 M+R+C Middlemen Retailers Consumers 
Correlation -.085 -.068 -.167 -.107 
Significance .169 .617 .211 .194 
Variable  %Low Quality Of Total Buy 
Corr .150 
Sign. .046 
Average  
knowledge of 
others N 178 
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Test 2B: Test for correlation between trust and stated existence of a preferred business 
partner. 
Outcome of this test is calculated using sample 2, 3 and 4. No correlation could be found 
between the stated trust level and the stated existence of a preferred business partner, as is 
shown in table 4. When tested for each of the roles that were able to trace, there still is no 
correlation found.  
 
Table 4: Correlation between stated trust and stated existence of a preferred business partner. 
 M+R+C Middlemen Retailers Consumers 
Correlation -.062 -.027 .262 -.201 
Significance .505 .891 .206 .105 
 
Test 2C: Test whether tracing was the only way to reveal cheats. 
It is invisible from the outside whether the product is of high or low quality. If the sub-
propositions are confirmed, there have to be mechanisms at work between traders that make 
cheats detectable. 
 
Test 2CA: The more a participant is cheated upon, the more he will trace. 
Test for correlation between the number of traces and the number of cheated envelopes of a 
particular actor. Outcome: significant for retailers and consumers with sample 2, 3 and 4. 
Table 5 shows that the proposition cannot be generally accepted on a 5% confidence level. 
(Sign. = 0.085). The population consists of all cheatable participants, being middleman, 
retailers and consumers. When the population is dived in middlemen, retailers and consumers 
the proposition can be accepted for retailers and consumers.  
 
Table 5: Correlation between number of traces and the number of cheated envelopes of a 
particular actor 
 M+R+C Middlemen Retailers Consumers 
Correlation .100 -.085 .263 .187 
Significance .085 .510 .034 .015 
 
Test 2CB: Tracers will reveal more cheats than random tracing would. 
If cheating cannot be detected from other methods than checking an envelope, the chances of 
revealed a cheat with tracing are equal to the ratio cheated / not cheated envelopes the 
participant bought. The test shows significance for consumers using sample 2, 3 and 4 for all 
actors who traced for differencing means of the percentage cheated envelopes found in a trace 
and the percentage envelopes of all bought envelopes of each individual actor. The test is 
done both with a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test and a paired sample T-Test to see whether the 
conclusion holds true both for the assumption of normally distributed variables (T-Test) and 
just similar distribution (Wilcoxon). Both are significant for consumers on the 10% 
confidence interval (Table 6 and 7). For the other roles the number of tracers was to low to 
have a usable N.  
 
Table 6A: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test for cheating detection (Ranks) 
role     N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks 
Consumer PercentageCheatedOfTrace - 
PercentageCheatedOfBuy 
Negative Ranks 19(a) 14.29 271.50 
    Positive Ranks 20(b) 25.43 508.50 
    Ties 8(c)     
    Total 47     
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a  PercentageCheatedOfTrace < PercentageCheatedOfBuy 
b  PercentageCheatedOfTrace > PercentageCheatedOfBuy 
c  PercentageCheatedOfTrace = PercentageCheatedOfBuy 
 
Table 6B: Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test for cheating detection (Test Statistics) 
role  
PercentageCheatedOfTrace - 
PercentageCheatedOfBuy 
Consumer Z 
-1.654(a) 
  Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 
.098 
a  Based on negative ranks. 
 
Table 7: Paired samples test for cheating detection 
role   Paired Differences t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
  Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
      
Consumer PercentageCheatedOfBuy - 
PercentageCheatedOfTrace 
-.08810 .33045 .04820 -1.828 46 .074 
 
 
6. Discussion 
Test 1A confirms that there was a preference for some trade partners above others in the Trust 
and Tracing game. This proves that the sessions were not a perfect market, because a perfect 
market would have forced prices of all suppliers towards the equilibrium price and clients 
wouldn’t have had preferences when the price was the same.  
Test 1B investigates what factors determine outcomes of the performance indicators money 
and points for the various roles. Included in the analysis are financial, relational and 
behavioural factors. Sub-tests show a difference between trader roles and consumer roles. 
Consumers gathered more points in sessions with more participants, when they knew and 
trusted the other participants less, when they had fewer suppliers and when buying with a bulk 
strategy. Neither the amount of money spent, nor being cheated upon, nor cooperating, nor 
knowing some people better than others were significant. The scores of the factors explaining 
the results of consumers lead to the view that consumers who were successful used the 
network mechanism to set up a working trade relation for repeated transactions in high 
volumes. Consumers who knew the others better and trusted them more were less successful 
in terms of points earned. Pre-existing relations thus hindered a fast exchange of goods in the 
setting of the Trust and Tracing game. 
For traders the situation was different. Successful traders were again in sessions with many 
participants, but they cooperated. The average knowledge and trust of others was not 
significant, but knowing some people better than others was. The more buyers they had, the 
better. Neither the number of cheats nor the number of envelopes sold significantly influenced 
the amount of money earned. From session transcripts and from the questionnaires it becomes 
clear that the preferred partner to cooperate with was somebody in the same role (especially 
producers among each other). The dominant mode of organization used by successful traders 
seems to be market. Successful traders formed a monopoly on the products and traded with as 
many clients as possible. The importance of knowing some people better than others could 
indicate that the ones you knew better were easier to bind for a sell.  
 
The outcomes of test 1B and the preferences for trade partners from test 1A lead to the 
conclusion that pre-existing social relations did influence the course of the action in the Trust 
and Tracing game. Consumers who earned many points were the ones that were less socially 
embedded, due to their lower knowledge and trust of the others. They were able to form 
efficient network modes of organization with few suppliers. Traders who earned a lot of 
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money used the market mechanism by forming monopolies and trading with as many clients 
as possible. Being socially embedded and letting your social network influence your trade 
behaviour was not positive for the score on the performance indicators in the situation of the 
Trust and Tracing game.  
Test 1C further illustrates this with correlations found. Traders who trusted others more 
cheated more upon their buyers: a clear case of opportunistic behaviour. The better the 
average knowledge of the other participants the higher the percentage of low quality of their 
total buy, which is a way to avoid being cheated upon. Traders who cooperated more 
according to their questionnaire cheated less and sold fewer envelopes. Combined with the 
trader model from test 1B this indicates that cooperating traders were able to ask better prices 
for their goods, eliminating the temptation to cheat to earn more. Sticking to the market 
mechanism they just sold goods at a high price, without exploiting trust by being 
opportunistic. 
 
The positive effect of the number of participants on the outcomes of both consumers and 
traders can be explained by the qualitative observations that in smaller groups the participants 
were watching each others’ moves. People would listen to the negotiations of other people in 
the room. Fast exchange of goods was rare, especially in the beginning of the session. The 
larger the group, the more the noise levels went up, and hearing a conversation without being 
physically close was impossible. Participants who were a bit late in starting to trade quickly 
stood up and approached a possible trade partner. There were fewer passive participants in 
larger settings. A sound pressure level-measurement would have been an interesting variable 
in retrospect. 
 
It has been impossible to find correlations between (ex ante) trust and the number of traces 
(Test 2A) or between trust and the existence of a preferred business partner (Test 2B). The 
trust stated in the pre-questionnaire did not show in trade relationships. The next question is 
whether the tracing mechanism was the only source of finding out who was honest or not. 
Although technically it is impossible to know the real quality of an envelope until opening it, 
it might be that other mechanisms help in detecting cheats as well. Test 2C proves via two 
paths that a traced envelope was not a randomly selected product. There is a positive relation 
between how often one has been cheated upon and the number of traces (for consumers and 
retailers). This means that people who were cheated upon did suspect this and performed 
traces accordingly. A possible explanation is that the load A-sessions (Sample 2 and 3) were 
allowed to check their envelopes between rounds in the 3-round sessions. If they found out 
they were cheated upon they could start tracing more. To investigate this explanation the 
second test in test 2C was carried out. It showed that the percentage of cheats found when 
doing a trace was higher than could be expected if a trace was a random choice. Because 
being cheated upon in the next round is independent of the round before, the second test 
proves that participants were better in detecting cheats than could be expected. There must be 
social mechanisms at work that detect if one is being cheated upon. 
  
The initial assumption was that existing social relationships would be beneficial for building 
trade relationships, incorporating the social network in a newly formed trade network. In the 
setting of the Trust and Tracing game the opposite is true when considering the performance 
indicators money and points only. What has not been measured is the quality of the trade 
relations formed. A first possible explanation for the gap between the social relations and 
trade relations comes from the institutional environment the T&T game provides. It might be 
that the people who were not successful in terms of the performance indicators money and 
points were more successful in building a good relationship that might pay off in the future. 
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The duration of a game session is relatively short. In almost any session the people who were 
less successful on the performance indicators explained afterwards that they were busy 
making negotiations, exploring the wishes of their possible clients or waiting politely for busy 
producers to have some time negotiating. Repeating the game with the same group of people 
would be very interesting to see if cheats from the past and the trade relations built would lead 
to new long-term relations with trusted partners. A change in the incentive structure, like for 
instance taking into account both money and the amount of points for consumers and price per 
point earned by traders, would possibly change the nature of the negotiations. Sessions with a 
different incentive structure would be interesting for future research. 
A second explanation for the gap between social and trade relations might come from the 
culture of the participants in the sessions. In the sample 1 sessions the multi-cultural sessions 
yielded interesting qualitative observations. In the sample 2, 3 and 4 sessions together 73% of 
the participants had the Dutch nationality. On the cultural dimensions of Hofstede (Hofstede 
and Hofstede, 2005) the Dutch are particularly individualistic, extremely feminine, and have a 
lower than average uncertainty avoidance index. This combination of dimensions leads to a 
cultural profile in which the risk of being cheated upon is not very important to them, nor is it 
to be a member of a permanent group. The dominance of the Dutch in the number of 
participants might explain the course of the sessions. The numbers of participants from other 
cultures are too low and they are spread over too many nationalities to distinguish 
quantitatively between nationalities in the analysis. A series of sessions with people from one 
or two nationalities could build a group to compare with the Dutch sessions. This way culture 
could be incorporated directly as an independent variable in the analysis. 
A third possible explanation could be what Omta and Van Rossum (1999) called the ‘dark 
side of cooperation’. In ten leading R&D firms they noted the negative effects of being 
embedded due to social liability, e.g. reducing the possibilities for relating to companies 
outside the network. Uzzi (1997) mentions the vulnerability of firms that are ‘over-embedded’ 
too, because they do not have access to new partners giving them a unique collaboration 
within the trade network. In the situation of the Trust and Tracing game the incentive 
structure of the gaming simulation is strictly economic, as you either earn money or points. 
The social embeddedness could shape the transaction costs such that switching between trade 
partners is not likely. The possibility of a better price might not be attractive when you lose a 
friend and possibly future business partner. Buying something might not be only for the 
purpose of points or money but could be a gesture to a friend too. While the Trust and Tracing 
game allowed for making transaction costs a little more measurable via the checking costs, it 
cannot measure the other types of transaction costs in its current form. Williamsons (2000) 
and Menards (2005) remark of transaction costs being notoriously hard to measure still is true. 
 
Methodology 
The use of gaming simulation as data gathering tool for testing quantitative hypotheses in 
chains and network is new. In the current a methodology has been used that is part of a larger 
(Ph.D-)project in which more research in the domain of chains and networks is addressed 
using the method. The T&T game was the first case to start in the project. 
The methodology can be divided in two cycles (design and empirical), as is depicted in Figure 
10. The design cycle is a basic iterative design cycle used in many design approaches (Duke 
and Geurts, 2004; Fullerton and Hofmann, 2004, among others). Iterative improvements are 
checked against and steered by a list of requirements (#4) and (game) design theory (#5) in 
test sessions.  
The important aspect for empirical research is that the design cycle results in both the tool and 
induced hypotheses. Testing and developing a gaming simulation gives better insights in the 
complexity of the problem through the test sessions that can help in the start-up of the 
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empirical cycle. Duke and Geurts’ approach of formulating the problem with participants in 
the game sessions is a far worked out application of the same principle. 
In the case of the T&T game the design cycle resulted in a gaming simulation with a learning 
purpose and was almost completed before the start of the PhD project. In the project the 
empirical cycle was added and the last rounds of the design cycle were completed. Meijer et 
al (2006) give a full description of the gaming simulation prototype (#6), test session setup 
(#7), test sessions (#8) and unstructured session transcripts (#9). The empirical cycle took the 
finalized gaming simulation prototype (i.e. The T&T game) as a given gaming simulation tool 
(#13). The sessions described in Meijer et al (2006) (sample 1-sessions) resulted in induced 
hypotheses (#10). Hypotheses from theory (#11) were added too. In the current paper 
hypothesis 1 is an induced hypothesis while hypothesis 2 stems from theory. 
 
An experimental session setup (#12) (section 4.2) has been constructed having a list of 
variables and hypotheses to be collected and tested. An important third element for the 
experimental session setup is the case description (#3). For the T&T game the case 
description has been kept simple as it models a generic supply networks of good with a 
hidden quality attribute. The absence of a real-life chain as case to provide constraints for the 
experimental session setup cleared the path to use student groups as participants. The 
experimental session setup defines the data collection methods, load and situation of the data 
sessions.  
 
Figure 10: Methodology scheme T&T game research. 
 
The experimental session setup defined the constraints for organizing data sessions (#14). The 
sessions resulted in two types of data (#16 and #18) that were analyzed using statistical 
methods (#15, as described in this paper) and observation methods (#17, used as clarification 
only in this paper). Intermediate conclusions (#19) derived from the data lead to adaptations 
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in the experimental session setup (i.e. the need to adjust the load and questionnaire as 
described in section 4.2) 
 
Preparing the data gathered for analysis has been a complicated task. The design of the T&T 
game did not incorporate a time stamp to each transaction. In the data collection it has not 
been feasible to add a time-stamp to each transaction without altering the way the T&T game 
is played. This made it impossible to see the effects of a cheat or trace on later transactions or 
lack of it. Furthermore the materials used (labels, envelopes, game money) made the 
digitization of the data very labour intensive. Standard tools like SPSS and Excel could not 
convert the individual transactions to data per participant, so that it was necessary to build a 
custom data converter tool. Looking back, the broad scope of the research and the explorative 
nature of it, combined with a pre-existing gaming simulation not designed for quantitative 
data analysis resulted in a complicated and time-consuming analysis phase. In a second case 
within the project two of the authors have been involved in the design and application of a 
gaming simulation for a specific research question with pre-determined analytical 
requirements. This project (Zuniga et al, 2007) started later and ended sooner, benefiting from 
the focus on specific data to be gathered. The number of sessions required to gather this data 
was lower due to a better design of the gaming simulation. Special attention has been paid to 
the operationalization of the concepts to be measured. A one-to-one translation of a concept to 
a variable in the gaming simulation helped dramatically in the analysis. Important concepts 
should not be derived from a constellation of variables but be measured directly. Kriz and 
Hense (2006) come to the same conclusion for improvement of gaming simulations for 
learning and propagate ‘theory-based evalution’-methods. 
  
7.         Conclusions 
The first hypothesis (The dominant mode of organization used in the T&T game is Network, 
not Market) could be confirmed for consumers and rejected for traders. Further analysis 
showed the influence of pre-existing social relations on the course of the action in the 
sessions. Being socially embedded was not positive for financial results in a session. Reasons 
have been discussed why this could be the case. The second hypothesis (High trust between 
traders in a network reduces transaction costs) has been rejected. Neither measurable 
transaction costs from tracing nor the appearance of a preferred business partner with high 
trust could be found. Further analysis revealed that participants are able to suspect cheats 
based on other factors than tracing.  
The previous conclusions prove that it has been possible to test hypotheses quantitatively 
using data gathered in sessions with the gaming simulation. The method worked. It has 
yielded a data set that could be analyzed using quantitative techniques. The way it has been 
done is a contribution to the gaming simulation methodology, both in type of data gathering 
and application domain. The field of chains and networks now has a new tested research 
method to complement the methods already in use.  
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Appendix 1: List of sessions with the Trust and Tracing game. 
 
N
u
m
b
e
r
 
Year, place and number Sa
m
ple
 
#P
rod
u
ce
rs
 
#M
iddle
m
e
n
 
#R
etaile
rs
 
#C
o
n
su
m
e
rs
 
#P
a
rticip
a
nts
 
#E
n
velop
e
s
 
S
old
 By
 P
 
#E
n
velop
e
s
 
B
o
ught
 By
 M
 
#E
n
velop
e
s
 
B
o
ught
 By
 R
 
#E
n
velop
e
s
 
B
o
ught
 By
 C
 
1 2005 WUR SCM course, session 1 1 
         
2 2005 WUR SCM course, session 2 1 
         
3 2005 WUR SCM course, session 3 1 
         
4 2005 WUR SCM course, session 4 1 
         
5 2005 WUR SCM course, session 5 1 
         
6 2005 RU, SCM course 1 
         
7 2005 WUR Food Safety Economics course 1 
         
8 2006 WUR Food Safety Economics course 2 4 4 4 9 21 148 33 32 150 
9 2006 KSV knowledge session 3 4 4 4 8 20 120 46 31 130 
10 2006 Larensteijn SCM week 3 2 1 2 4 9 82 6 21 116 
11 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 1 2 3 3 3 14 23 134 46 47 170 
12 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 2 2 3 3 3 9 18 105 79 69 58 
13 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 3 3 2 1 2 3 8 2 2 5 70 
14 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 4 2 3 2 2 6 13 0 0 0 0 
15 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 5 2 3 3 3 9 17 134 85 61 146 
16 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 6 2 2 2 2 5 11 79 9 37 70 
17 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 7 2 2 2 2 5 11 48 48 38 57 
18 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 8 2 2 2 2 5 11 85 32 59 83 
19 2005 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 9 2 3 2 3 6 14 91 4 21 93 
20 2006 Imagineering teachers 2 3 2 2 6 13 127 11 23 138 
21 2006 RU, SCM course 1+2 3 3 3 7 16 143 36 12 118 
22 2006 WUR SCM course, session 1 2 2 2 2 4 10 40 43 36 24 
23 2006 WUR SCM course, session 2 2 3 2 2 5 12 138 43 18 124 
24 2006 WUR SCM course, session 4 2 4 4 4 8 20 113 98 77 108 
25 2006 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 1 2 2 1 2 4 9 38 17 21 43 
26 2006 WSM, Purdue university MBA Group 2 2 2 1 3 8 23 19 9 25 
27 2005 KUB SCM course  2 3 3 3 8 17 102 47 37 93 
28 2005 TOMATO session Venlo venue 1 Sebas 1+3 3 3 3 6 15 141 62 46 134 
29 2005 TOMATO session Venlo venue 2 Gert Jan 1 
         
30 2005 Agrotechnology welcome session 7pp 3 2 1 2 3 8 69 0 69 56 
31 2005 WSM, Purdue university MBA Group 1+3 3 3 3 12 21 115 23 24 112 
32 2003 WSM, Purdue university MBA Group 1 
         
33 2005 Scholierenconferentie session 1 1 
         
34 2005 Scholierenconferentie session 2 1 
         
35 2006 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 2 2 3 3 3 6 15 145 137 123 127 
36 2006 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 3 4 3 3 3 8 17 118 31 17 117 
37 2006 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 4 4 3 2 2 6 13 122 16 20 118 
38 2006 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 5 4 3 2 2 5 12 111 29 13 110 
39 2006 Larensteijn SCM course 4 3 3 3 8 17 86 29 22 89 
40 2006 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 6 4 2 2 2 5 11 74 12 0 62 
41 2006 INHOLLAND SCM course, session 7 4 3 3 3 11 20 100 21 16 120 
42 2005 Kids session with primary school children 1 
         
43 2003 Ministry of Agriculture knowledge center 1 
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Appendix 2: Questions asked in the questionnaires 
 
Pre questionnaire: 
Your name:   
Your gender:  Female   Male 
Your year of birth:    19 
Your country of birth: 
Your home country (if different): 
Your study: 
 
How well do you know the other participants? 
 On average I know them: very well 1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5    not at all 
 I know some of them much    1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5   I know them  
 better than others.        equally well 
 
How much do you trust the other participants? 
 Most of them can be trusted       1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5   I trust none of them 
 
 
Post questionnaire: 
 
Have you been cheating?   never   1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5     all the time 
 
Did you get away with cheating?  never   1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5     all the time 
 
Did you cooperate with somebody else? never   1 … 2 … 3 … 4 … 5     all the time 
 If so, with whom?...................................................... 
 If so, why?................................................................. 
 
